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COMMENTS
broker makes the sale, pending negotiations by the broker, the com-
mission may still be recovered if the broker is the "procuring cause"
of the sale, the issue of "procuring cause" being for the jury " Where
a sale is made to the broker's customer, there is an excellent chance
that the broker will be held to have been the procuring cause unless
he has abandoned negotiations before the sale.7
75 Godefroy v. Hupp, 93 Wash. 371, 160 Pac. 1056 (1916), Keith v. Peart, 115
Wash. 552, 197 Pac. 928 (1921).
76 Bethel v. Preston, 157 Wash. 652, 290 Pac. 224 (1930).
BOUNDARY DISPUTES IN WASHINGTON
JA.zs R. ELLIS
Quarrels over the physical edges of land ownership still appear on
court calendars with disturbing frequency, displaying their peculiar
bitterness beyond all value involved. A major factor swelling this liti-
gation has been confusion over the various legal doctrines available
in these disputes. Boundary line problems are often capable of treat-
ment on several similar grounds and occasionally present contradictory
equities, but they need not be a legal quagmire. This comment will
attempt to analyze certain of the formulae currently applied to bound-
ary disputes in Washington with particular reference to the doctrines
of Acquiescence and Recognition, Oral Agreement, and Estoppel m
Pats.' It is the writer's opinion that recent definitive decisions by our
court have placed these rules on a new plane of clarity.
ORAL BOUNDARY AGREEMENTS
It has been long settled m the .law that under certain circumstances
boundary lines may be permanently and irrevocably established by a
parol agreement between adjoining owners.2 Such agreements have
been favored as minimizing vexatious litigation by encouraging neigh-
boring land owners to settle their problems between themselves.8 It 'is
in designating the circumstances requisite to the validity of these
agreements that courts have differed. Our court has built an increas-
ingly definite pattern of its own, from which a number of rules can
now be determined with reasonable accuracy
I The doctrine of Adverse Possession is omitted as requiring separate treatment.
2 The conclusion of the author of an exhaustive annotation on the subject m 69
A. L. R. 1433.8 Loustalot v. McKeel, 157 Cal. 634, 108 Pac. 707 (1910), quoted with approval in
Rose v. Fletcher, 83 Wash. 623, 626, 145 Pac. 989 (1915).
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In the first place, there must be an agreement. The two adjoining
land owners must manifest some deliberate intention to accept a cer-
tain line on the ground as their common boundary The doctrine of
oral agreement excludes any idea of a unilateral location. ' It is con-
ventionally stated that the agreement may be either express or implied
from conduct of the parties, but the Washington court has been reluc-
tant to imply agreements under conditions which would not raise an
estoppel. At best it may be said that the conduct of the parties will be
evidence of an agreement which can be rebutted by proof of no agree-
ment or of a contrary agreement.' The manifested intention of the
adjoining owners must clearly be to accept a given line on the ground
as the permanent boundary between their tracts. The agreed line can
not be treated as a mere barrier between the lands,' nor as a line of
convenient demarcation subject to discovery of the true line,' nor can
it be located under the mistaken belief that it is the true line when
there is no intention of recognizing any line other than the true one.'
In all cases where an agreed line is alleged, the burden of proof is on
the party seeking to assert the oral agreement.'
Assuming that the parties have deliberately agreed to accept a given
line as their common boundary and have staked or otherwise marked
it, their agreement will still fail unless certain conditions are present.
It is generally stated that such an agreement will not be binding unless
it has been made either to resolve an uncertainty in the location of
the line or to settle a dispute between the parties. Frequently the cen-
tral question in litigation over agreed lines is whether a dispute or
uncertainty is presented by the facts."
Where the descriptions in the deeds of two adjoining properties
overlap, or where it is otherwise impossible to locate a definite common
line therefrom, under the reasoning of most courts there is sufficient
uncertainty to support a valid oral agreement fixing that line, regard-
less of the presence or absence of a dispute. By the same token where
4 Hruby v. Lonseth, 63 Wash. 589, 116 Pac. 26 (1911)
56 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY 510 (Perm. Ed. 1940).
6 Thomas v. Harlan, 27 Wn.(2d) 512, 178 P.(2d) 965 (1947).
7 Phinney v. Campbell, 16 Wash. 203, 47 Pac. 502 (1896).
8 Huddart v. McGuirk, 186 Cal. 386, 199 Pac. 494 (1921) , but see divergent views
in cases discussed in 69 A. L. R. 1485 et seq.
9 Jackman v. Germain, 96 Wash. 415, 420, 165 Pac. 78 (1917) and see cases in 69
A. L. R. 1489.
10 See wide variety of fact patterns in the cases discussed in 69 A. L. R. 1443 et seq.
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a bona fide dispute clearly appears, the majority of courts will not
further insist upon a showing of uncertainty in the deeds. If the
descriptions are uncertain, an oral location is treated not as a convey-
ance of land but simply as an ascertainment of the extent of ownership.
There need be no hostile attitude or quarrel to constitute a dispute,
simply a real difference of opinion between the parties as to the location
of their ground line, which they intend to settle by agreement.1
With the principles discussed above few judges will quarrel; it is
over a more difficult problem posed for our court by the case of Rose
v. Fletcher'2 that authorities have differed. This early decision upheld
an agreed line although the description in the deeds was definite and
no dispute existed at the time of the agreement. The parties simply
did not know the location on the ground of the line called for in their
deeds and decided to hire a surveyor and accept his findings. The court
stated that the surveyor's erroneous line was controlling and that the
case fell within the "doctrine of agreed boundaries."' " A minority of
other courts have agreed that ascertamability is not inconsistent with
an oral agreement if the parties do not in fact know the location,"4
but most jurisdictions treat a line which could be determined by a
correct survey as a definite line, " unalterable by parol in the absence
of dispute. As an abstract proposition it might seem that the uncer-
tainty of the parties rather than of the instruments of title should be
the real consideration. Indefiniteness in the deeds can be treated as a
reflection of uncertainty in the minds of the parties. This concept of
uncertainty is no more subjective in nature than that of a dispute. It is
submitted that a simple disagreement between the parties as to the
location of their line on the ground is not logically different from a
mutual ignorance of that location where a deliberate agreement per-
manently to fix the line is involved. However, this analysis may be
somewhat unreal in the face of an artificial legal barrier as firmly
established as the statute of frauds. Most courts have considered that
if a line is accurately described in the deed, an agreement to accept
another line would amount to a parol conveyance of land and be void
under the statute. This argument was not squarely met in Rose v.
Fletcher but the holding, as yet not overruled, was plainly against it."
11 Brock v. Muse, 232 Ky. 293, 22 S. W. (2d) 1034 (1929).
12 83 Wash. 623, 145 Pac. 989 (1915).
1s Ibid., at p. 626.
14 Muchenberger v. City of Santa Monica, 206 Cal. 635, 275 Pac. 803 (1929).
15 Hartung v. Witte, 59 Wis. 285, 18 N. W 175 (1884).
16 Rose v. Fletcher, 83 Wash. 623, 145 Pac. 989 (1915).
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In the recent case of Windsor v. Bourcier" the court held that a defi-
nite boundary whose location is fixed and known to the parties can not
be changed by a parol agreement. By negative implication this decision
gives some support to the Fletcher case where the parties did not know
the location of the line, but also indicates that an agreement under
such circumstances will be examined closely It should be noted, how-
ever, that in the Fletcher case many improvements had been made and
there had been an acquiescence of 20 years; so at least two alternate
grounds might have been used to reach the same result. 8
In many of the difficult cases improvements are made in reliance on
the agreement, and there the court may avoid the problem of the
statute of frauds by way of estoppel. But improvements are not neces-
sary to execute a valid oral agreement. If a court, looking through the
lens of its own precedents, will see either dispute or uncertainty in the
facts, then a mere marking of trees along a definite line will be suffi-
cient to take an oral agreement out of the statute. 9 Will our court find
such uncertainty where the line is definite in the papers of title but
doubtful in the minds of the parties? This becomes difficult to foretell
when the weakness of the Fletcher case is considered in conjunction
with the reluctance in decisions to depart from written descriptions."
If the agreement is stripped of the presence of long acquiescence,
improvements, dispute, and uncertainty in the instruments, then its
validity should be considered an open question in this state.
BOUNDARY BY ESTOPPEL
In early Washington cases the doctrine of Estoppel in Pats was often
referred to without being definitively applied. After a recitation of
facts establishing a valid oral boundary line agreement or even con-
summated adverse possession, the court would state that the party
seeking to change the line so established was "estopped" to do so. The
elements of estoppel, which might or might not have been present
were usually not discussed. However, in a line of recent cases the court
has begun to confine the use of the term to cases where it was clearly
a sound basis of decision for the facts set forth. The recent case of
1'21 Wn.(2d) 313, 150 P.(2d) 717 (1944).
'is Estoppel ,t Pats or Acquiescence and Recognition.
19 Tietjen v. Dobson, 170 Ga. 123, 152 S. E. 222 (1930), 69 A. L. R. 1408 and see
numerous cases cited in the annotation.20See Tyree v. Gosa, 11 Wn.(2d) 572, 119 P.(2d) 926 (1941), Windsor v. Bour-
cier, 21 Wn.(2d) 313, 150 P.(2d) 717 (1944) , Thomas v. Harlan, 27 Wn.(2d) 512.
178 P.(2d) 965 (1947).
COMMENTS
Thomas v. Harlan1 announced the conventional elements of the doc-
trine as: "(i) an admission, statement, or act inconsistent with the
claim afterwards asserted; (2) action by the other party on the faith
of such an admission, statement, or act; and (3) injury to such other
party resulting from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate
such admission, statement or act.""
A sound approach to the Washington law on estoppel can be made
by coupling this clear statement of the doctrine with the rule of con-
struction announced in Tyree v. Gosa,3 that no boundary established
in a deed will be disturbed by way of estoppel unless the evidence is
"clear and cogent.'
The elements must all be present. If adjoining owner A knows his
neighbor B is making a survey of the common line and sees the setting
of some stakes but does not make improvements with reference to the
new line, the court will not establish the staked line by estoppel.2 1 If
owner A locates his buildings, choosing to make his own boundary
measurements, no line will be established by estoppel, since A did not
rely on any representations by B.12
Where the conduct of the party estopped consists of doing nothing,
a more difficult problem is posed. In the case of Eubanks v. Buckly '
estoppel was found although B merely watched adjoining owner A
rebuild a fence on a line used by their predecessors and acquiesced in
the fence line for eight years. Neither an agreement betwepn the prede-
cessors nor a prior adverse possession was involved. When the party
estopped has acted in bad faith and watched the construction of
improvements knowing they were being mistakenly placed on his land,
good conscience would support the estoppel. On the other hand, where
both parties were mnocently rmstaken, as in the Eubanks case, the
answer our court gave must seek support either in (i) an economic
policy which favors the improver of landi (2) a balancing of the value
of the improvements against the value of the land, or (3) the finding
of an implied agreement. In any event, if both parties have acted in
good faith, it should be clear that substantial damage will result to
the improver by enforcement of the true line before the courts attempt
to change it by estoppel.
2127 Wn. (2d) 512, 178 P. (2d) 965 (1947) and cases cited therein.
22 Ibid., at p. 518.
23 11 Wn.(2d) 572, 119 P.(2d) 926 (1941).
24 Ibtd, at p. 578.
25 Hruby v. Lonseth, 63 Wash. 589, 116 Pac. 26 (1911).
20 Thomas v. Harlan, 27 Wn. (2d) 512, 178 P. (2d) 965 (1947).
27 16 Wn.(2d) 24, 132 P.(2d) 353 (1942).
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Line bought and sold to If A buys land relying on statements of
adjoining owner B as to the location of the boundary and then devel-
ops the land, most courts will prevent B from thereafter asserting a
different location.28 The fact that A bought the land at least partly on
the faith of these declarations is strong evidence of change of position
on his part. However, where the only representations made to A come
from his vendor and this vendor does not contemporaneously own the
adjoining land, a different result is called for. If a line so designated is
found to be wrong, the vendee, A, may have an action for misrepre-
sentation against the vendor or may rescind but as against an abutting
owner not involved in the sale no boundary should be created by
estoppel. This reasoning finds clear authority in the case of Tyree v.
Gosa.2" There Gosa built his house relying on a corner located by his
vendor, although the adjoining owner, Tyree, had frequently expressed
his opinion that the corner was wrong. The court refused to raise an
estoppel saying, "No representations of Tyree induced the Meindls
and Gosas to locate their buildings where they did. They fixed the
locations of their buildings upon the representations of their vendor.'""°
The strength of this holding has not been weakened by later decisions31
and should be compelling on the court if the problem is properly before
it again.
A different problem is presented where the line is pointed out or
staked by a vendor-grantor who owns the land on both sides thereof.
In such cases the rule is ironclad that this grantor and his successors
are estopped to deny that the line so fixed is correct. In the early days
of the Washington court it was stated that "the location of a line by a
common grantor is binding upon the grantees." 2 This rule has been
uniformly followed through a series of strong decisions."8 It was
recently affirmed in the case of Strom v. Arcorace"' where the court
quoted with approval the following-
A practical location made by the common grantor of the division line
between the tracts granted is binding on the grantees who take with
28 8 Azi. JUR. 806.
29 1 Wn.(2d) 572, 119 P.(2d) 926 (1941).
80 Ibid., at p. 579.
81 Conpare Light v. McHugh, 128 Wash. Dec. 210, 183 P.(2d) 353 (1947), where
apparently inconsistent language can be reconciled by separating the claims of the
two plaintiffs and applying the estoppel language to the vendor only. The result of the
McHugh case is in no way contra to the Tyree case.
,2 Turner v. Creech, 58 Wash. 439, 108 Pac. 1084 (1910).
38 Roe v. Walsh, 76 Wash. 148, 135 Pac. 1031 (1913), Windsor v. Bourcier, 21
Wn.(2d) 313, 150 P.(2d) 717 (1944), Atwell v. Olson, 130 Wash. Dec. 165, 190
P.(2d) 783 (1948).
34 Strom v. Arcorace, 27 Wn.(2d) 478, 178 P.(2d) 959 (1947).
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reference to that boundary The line established in that manner is pre-
sumably the line mentioned in the deeds and no lapse of time is necessary
to establish such location, which does not rest on acquiescence in an errone-
ous boundary, but on the fact that the true location was made and the
conveyance in reference to it.8
This doctrine is the strongest of the many rules applied to boundary
disputes by the Washington court and is adhered to by the great weight
of American authority 0
ACQUIESCENCE AND RECOGNITION
There is language in many of our cases to support the acquisition of
land ownership by acquiescence. 7 It is almost always stated that in
absence of a valid agreement between the parties, or an estoppel raised
between them, that the acquiescence by two adjoining owners must
last for the period of the statute of limitations and be coupled with
possession up to that line."8 Some courts have held that all elements
of adverse possession must be shown in these cases, thus making the
doctrine merely a restatement of that method of land title acquisition.
Other authority holds that mere acquiescence and recognition of the
line as the boundary are enough. Our court requires recognition by the
parties of the line as a boundary, occupancy by the adjoining owners
up to this line, and acquiescence for a period of ten years. 9 Mere
acquiescence in the existence of a fence will not establish the fence
line unless the parties have actually recognized it as the boundary, "
Under such circumstances the difference between the doctrine of
acquiescence and an implied boundary agreement would seem to rest
primarily in the absence of any necessity for dispute or uncertainty
and in the period of time required to become binding. The difference
between acquiescence and adverse possession lies chiefly in proving the
element of adverseness or hostility and there, it is suggested, the differ-
ence is more of terminology than of fact.
In every boundary line dispute, peculiar and compelling equities
present themselves. No decision is completely diyorced from the pro-
cess of balancing these equities, and a party armed with- an appealing
argument of hardship will have a stout string in his bow However, the
85 11 C. J. S. 651.
80 Ibid., and cases cited therein.8 7 Farrow v. Plancich, 134 Wash. 690, 236 Pac. 288 (1925).88 Thomas v. Harlan, 27 Wn. (2d) 512, 176 P. (2d) 965 (1947).
s9 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
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existence of disproportionate values in land and the improvements
thereon will not by itself alter land ownership. To award land to the
improver even though compensation be given the owner, without meet
Ing the criteria for acquisition of legal ownership, would effect a private
condemniation. In Tyree v. Gosa4' it was said. "No court has the
power to compel a person to convey and surrender his property for
any other person's private use (except for ways of necessity) in
exchange for any sum, no matter how great.""2 This statement,
broader than generally recognized equity rules, indicates the reluctance
of the Washington court to let considerations of economic hardship
alter legally fixed boundaries unless they appear in a situation where
an otherwise substantial legal argument for alteration has been already
made out.
A survey of modern Washington boundary cases shows that the doc-
trines of Estoppel, Oral Agreement, and Acquiescence are very much
alive in the current of judicial thought. These doctrines can create or
dissolve boundary lines under a wide divergence of practical situations,
but all too often are inadequately presented to the court. The prac-
titioner can with profit separately and thoroughly consider each in the
solution of any boundary problem.
4111 Wn.(2d) 572, 119 P.(2d) 926 (1941).
42 Ibid., at p. 581.
HOW SECURE IS YOUR TAX FORECLOSURE TITLE?
L. R. BONNEVILLE, JR.*
The statute of the state of Washington relating to the conclusiveness
of tax judgments reads:
And any judgment for the deed to real property sold for delinquent taxes
shall estop all parties from raising any objections thereto and the
judgment itself shall be conclusive evidence of its regularity and validity
in all collateral proceedings, except in cases where the tax has been paid.
or the real property was not liable to the tax.-
In dealing with this statute in the past, the Supreme Court of Wash
ington has said, "The essential thing is the actual payment of the
taxes," 2 and "Thus it appears that the conclusive effect of the judgment
*Member of the Tacoma, Washington, Bar.
I REM. REV. STAT. § 11288 [P P C. § 979-313).
2 Puget Sound National Bank v. Biswanger, 59 Wash. 134, 139, 109 Pac. 327,
329 (1910)
